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In this report I argue that a popular account of the nature of ethical thought and 
talk – non-cognitivism – cannot make sense of our attempts to explain why some things 
are right or wrong, good or bad, just or unjust.  After introducing the process by which 
we attempt to explain these sorts of ethical features (a process I call ethical explanation), 
I consider how we might test whether non-cognitivism can account for this process. We 
can test whether non-cognitivism can account for ethical explanation, I argue, by testing 
whether non-cognitivism can account for the meanings of ethical explanatory sentences, 
the sentences we use to express explanatory thoughts in ethics. After considering how 
non-cognitivism might account for ethical explanatory sentences (and so the thoughts 
these sentences express), I develop a series of problem cases on which, I argue, no 
plausible non-cognitivist account of these meanings of these sentences is possible. 
Because non-cognitivism cannot account for the meanings of ethical explanatory 
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If an act is wrong, we expect there to be some explanation of this. No act is 
merely right or wrong in itself. Rightness and wrongness, like many other ethical 
features, require grounds. Suppose in the course of his teachings Socrates did something 
wrong and, in doing so, corrupted the youth of Athens. In that case we will expect there 
to be some explanation of the wrongness of Socrates’ act, an explanation that cites the 
grounding features of his act’s wrongness. In virtue of what, we might say, was Socrates’ 
act wrong? What made his act obtain the ethically serious character of wrongness, rather 
than obtain some other character? Perhaps we will cite the grounds given by his accusers 
– that he was a maker of new gods and a denier of the old – or perhaps we will search for 
other grounds. But it seems that between ourselves and Socrates’ accusers, themselves no 
fans of philosophy, there will be at least this much agreement: If Socrates did something 
wrong, there must be some explanation of this. 
The fact that many ethical features are not brute, but require explanation, is 
familiar and uncontroversial.1 We find this presumption in both philosophic and everyday 
attempts to say why an act is right or wrong or good or bad, and in arguments attempting 
to show that there could be no such explanations.2 This presumption underlies our 
conviction that ethical features can be made some sense of, and our discomfort when we 
find ourselves unable to make such sense of them.3 Yet ethical explanation, the process 
by which we attempt to explain ethical features, remains not well understood. What is it 
we are doing when we engage in this process? Could this process ever be successful, and 
if so, how? Any complete answer to these questions is bound to be controversial, yet such 
answers must ultimately be given if we are to successfully illuminate this important and 
ubiquitous process. In this paper I attempt to contribute to such an illumination by 
answering a basic question with respect to this process, namely, “Can non-cognitivism 
account for ethical explanation?”  
                                                
1 Recent discussion of explanation in the context of ethics includes Rosen (2010), Zangwill (2011), and 
Väyrynen (2013). Probably the best known expression of puzzlement with regard to explanation in ethics is 
due to Mackie (1977) p. 41: “…it is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty. But just what in the 
world is signified by this ‘because’?” 
2 Joyce (2007) p. 2 provides a nice list of arguments attempting to show that there could be no such 
explanations.  
3 Haidt (2012) provides numerous examples of subjects’ discomfort at affirming that a given act was wrong 
while being unable to explain why that act is wrong – the phenomena known as moral dumbfounding.  
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I will ultimately argue that non-cognitivism cannot account for ethical 
explanation, but before we can proceed to my main argument, I will need to lay some 
necessary groundwork. I begin laying this groundwork in chapter 1 by locating the 
challenge for non-cognitivism concerning ethical explanation. Here, I argue that we 
ought to understand this challenge as a particular instance of the embedding problem; it is 
the challenge non-cognitivism faces in accounting for the meanings of ethical 
explanatory sentences, the sentences we use to express explanatory thoughts in ethics. 
Having located the challenge, I move on in chapter 2 to describe the embedding problem. 
I then consider one way of responding to this problem – Gibbard’s fact-prac worlds 
account of sentence meaning – with the hope of developing a clearer picture of the 
resources the non-cognitivist has available to address the particular instance of the 
embedding problem we’re interested in. In chapter 3 I proceed to my main argument. I 
begin by describing a set of problem cases for non-cognitivist accounts of the meanings 
of ethical explanatory sentences. These are cases involving disagreements between 
distinct ethical explanatory sentences on which, I argue, no plausible non-cognitivist 
account of the meanings of these sentences can be given. I move on to consider Gibbard’s 
account of the meanings of ethical explanatory sentences, demonstrating that his specific 
proposal does indeed result in the sort of problem cases I describe. I then consider 
alternative ways a non-cognitivist might respond to these cases, ultimately determining 
that none appears satisfactory. I therefore conclude that non-cognitivism cannot account 













Chapter 1 – Locating the Challenge 
 
1.1 What is Non-Cognitivism? 
The non-cognitivist views I target in this paper are metaethical views about the 
nature of ethical thought and the meanings of ethical sentences. According to non-
cognitivism, 1) ethical thoughts can be explained solely on the basis of the functional role 
these thoughts play in motivating an agent to act, and 2) all sentences (including ethical 
sentences) can be explained solely in terms of the thoughts those sentences express. 
Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard are the principal modern adherents of this sort of 
non-cognitivism.4 According to Blackburn, ethical sentences express values, conceived of 
as relatively stable dispositions to act in certain ways, while according to Gibbard, ethical 
sentences express plans, conceived of as decisions about what to do in various situations.5 
In this paper, I focus primarily on Gibbard’s views for reasons of simplicity, though my 
target is more general. My argument applies to anyone who accepts non-cognitivism, 
understood as I have defined it above. 
 
1.2 How to Test Whether Non-Cognitivism can Account for Ethical Explanation 
Our question is whether non-cognitivism can account for ethical explanation, the 
process by which we attempt to explain ethical features. In this section, I argue that an 
appropriate way of testing whether non-cognitivism can account for ethical explanation is 
by testing whether non-cognitivism can account for the meanings of ethical explanatory 
sentences. I will first explain which sentences are ethical explanatory sentences, and then 
I will move on to explain the appropriateness of my proposed test. I will end this section 
by accounting for this test’s primary advantage – it will allow us to locate the challenge 
for non-cognitivist accounts of ethical explanation in a familiar place, as a particular 
instance of the embedding problem. 
Ethical explanatory sentences are the sentences we use to express explanatory 
thoughts in ethics. I have in mind sentences like the following: 
 
                                                
4 Gibbard (2003), Blackburn (1998). 
5 Gibbard (2003) pp. 49-50, Blackburn (1998) p. 67 
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 (1) Lying is bad because lying is willful deception. 
 (2) Right acts are right in virtue of the fact that they maximize happiness. 
(3) The fact that Socrates ought to Φ given his circumstances depends upon the 
fact that Φing in his circumstances would be endorsed by an ideal reasoner.  
 
These sentences are ethical sentences. Ethical sentences, for the purposes of this paper, 
have two defining features. First, an ethical sentence includes a paradigmatically 
normative or evaluative term, a term like “good,” right,” “ought,” or their contraries. And 
second, an ethical sentence expresses a thought that is capable of playing a functional 
role in originating an agent’s motivation to act.6 These sentences meet both of these 
criteria. They each include a normative or evaluative term, “bad,” “right,” and “ought,” 
respectively. In addition, each of the thoughts these sentences express is capable of 
playing a functional role in originating an agent’s motivation to act. For instance, an 
agent who thinks (1) will generally be motivated not to lie. An agent who thinks (2) will 
generally be motivated to act so as to maximize happiness. And an agent who thinks (3) 
will generally be motivated to Φ, assuming he thinks he is Socrates in the specified 
circumstances. 
In addition to being ethical sentences, sentences (1), (2), and (3) are also 
explanatory. Explanatory sentences answer “Why” questions in a given domain, 
questions about why various objects of explanation falling within that domain occur or 
obtain. Sentences of this form are common across all domains where philosophers have 
investigated explanation, and many domains that have yet to be investigated. Here are 
three examples of this sort of sentence from the domains of history, science, and 
metaphysics, respectively. 
 
(4) The Empire of Japan surrendered to the Allies in 1945 because of the threat of 
another atomic bombing. 
                                                
6 It is important to distinguish the thoughts expressed by ethical sentences, thoughts that originate an 
agent’s motivation to act, from other thoughts that may play some subsidiary or enabling role in motivating 
the agent to act. Only thoughts that originate said motivation are ethical thoughts. 
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(5) The fact that the particle is accelerating obtains in virtue of the fact that it is 
being acted on by some net positive force.7 
(6) The fact that that object is a table depends upon the fact that it is composed of 
a series of atoms, arranged table-wise. 
 
Explanatory sentences have a common form. That form is “X because Y” where “X” (but 
not necessarily “Y”) is or expresses an object of explanation within the domain in 
question and “because” stands for a paradigmatic explanatory idiom like “because,” “in 
virtue of” or “depends upon.”8 Objects of explanation vary from domain to domain. And 
which objects of explanation are appropriate for explanation in a given domain will 
depend on the specific details of one’s view. For the purposes of this paper, I wish to 
remain metaethically neutral with regard to the objects of ethical explanation. In this vein 
I will claim only that the appropriate objects of ethical explanation either are or are 
expressed by ethical sentences. Sentences (1), (2), and (3) meet the criteria for being 
explanatory sentences. Each of these sentences has the common form of explanatory 
sentences, “X because Y.” In addition, each of these sentences answers a “Why” question 
about an object of explanation in the ethical domain. Those questions are “Why is lying 
bad?” “Why are right acts right?” and “Why ought Socrates Φ given his circumstances?” 
respectively. And those objects of explanation are or are expressed by “Lying is bad,” 
“Right acts are right,” and “Socrates ought Φ given his circumstances,” respectively. 
Because these objects of explanation are ethical, in addition to being explanatory 
sentences, sentences (1), (2), and (3) are also ethical explanatory sentences. 
Having explained which sentences are ethical explanatory sentences, I will now 
explain the appropriateness of the test I proposed at the start of this section. That test, 
you’ll recall, is intended to answer the question of whether non-cognitivism can account 
for ethical explanation. We can test whether non-cognitivism can account for ethical 
explanation, I claimed, by testing whether non-cognitivism can account for the meanings 
of ethical explanatory sentences, the sentences we use to express explanatory thoughts in 
ethics. This test is appropriate for answering our basic question because ethical 
                                                
7 This example is taken directly from Fine (2012) p. 1 
8 Explanatory idioms can reverse this pattern, becoming “Y explains X”. For example, “The fact that lying 
is willful deception explains the fact that lying is wrong.” 
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explanation, at least on non-cognitivism, requires the explanatory thoughts expressed by 
ethical explanatory sentences, and the meanings of these sentences are explained 
(according to non-cognitivism) in terms of the thoughts these sentences express. This 
means that a test concerning the meanings of these sentences can itself serve as a test for 
whether or not non-cognitivism can account for ethical explanation. If non-cognitivism 
cannot account for the meanings of ethical explanatory sentences then, ipso facto, they 
will not be able to account for the explanatory thoughts those sentences express. But 
since ethical explanation requires these thoughts, if non-cognitivism is not able to 
account for these thoughts, they will not be able to account for ethical explanation. 
Let me say a bit more about ethical explanation and why it requires explanatory 
thoughts (at least on non-cognitivism). Ethical explanation, I keep saying, is the process 
by which we attempt to explain ethical features. It is difficult to say anything very 
detailed about this process without making controversial metaethical assumptions. 
Nevertheless this is a familiar and ubiquitous process, engaged in by both philosophers 
and laypeople alike. One of the ways philosophers engage in ethical explanation is by 
constructing ethical theories. These theories attempt to answer, in a general way, various 
“Why” questions in ethics, questions about why different sorts of objects of explanation 
in ethics obtain. For example, in addition to asking why a particular act is right, I can also 
ask the more general question, “Why are right acts right?” Consequentialism gives an 
answer to this question. According to this theory, right acts are those that produce the 
best consequences and those acts are right because they produce the best consequences. 
The Humean Theory of Reasons can be thought of as addressing the general question, 
“Why is R a reason for A to φ?” The answer, according to one version of the theory, is 
that R is a reason for A to φ because R explains how A’s φing fulfills one of A’s desires. 
While philosophers often focus their attention on answering the most general sorts of 
“Why” questions in ethics, laypeople (and philosophers in everyday life) often pursue 
answers to more particular sorts of “Why” questions in ethics. For example, in the 2012 
U.S. election, many voters answered the questions “Why should I vote for Barack 
Obama?” and “Why should I vote for Mitt Romney?” in an attempt to decide whom to 
vote for. Just this morning, I answered the particular question “Why ought I work on this 
paper?” in the course of deciding what I would do today. And you have probably recently 
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answered the question “Why ought I read this paper?” in the course of deciding what you 
are now doing right now.  
We can see from these examples that, ordinarily, when we attempt to answer 
these sorts of “Why” questions in ethics, questions about why a given ethical feature 
obtains, we engage in ethical explanation; ordinarily, when we attempt to say why a 
given act is wrong (for instance), we’re attempting to explain why that act is wrong.9 
Further, I claim, we can see from these examples that correctly answering these sorts of 
“Why” questions in ethics is required in order for ethical explanation to succeed; we 
cannot succeed in explaining why a given act is wrong (for instance) without correctly 
answering the question of why that act is wrong. Although I doubt many would deny that 
explaining why a given act is wrong requires answering the question of why that act is 
wrong, some might doubt the general claim I made in light of specific examples such as 
this: that successful ethical explanation requires answering a certain sort of “Why” 
question. After all, one might argue, there are other sorts of questions one might attempt 
to answer, the correct answering of which we might intuitively think of as instances of 
successful ethical explanation. To give just two examples, the questions “In virtue of 
what qualities was Adolf Hitler a bad man?” and “How did Adolf Hitler become a bad 
man?” are questions we might correctly answer, and neither of these is a “Why” question. 
Further, we might be tempted to think that correctly answering these questions would 
qualify as instances of successful ethical explanation. Nevertheless, although it is 
possible to answer both of these questions, this fact fails to falsify my claim, that 
correctly answering a certain sort of “Why” question is required in order for ethical 
explanation to succeed. 
The second sort of question fails to falsify my claim, because, although we might 
provide an answer to this question in the form of a causal explanation for how Adolf 
Hitler became a bad man, such an explanation would fail to be an ethical explanation. 
The reason for this is that the corresponding object of explanation that this question wants 
                                                
9 One exception to this ordinary pattern is when a person attempts to say why an act has a given moral 
feature despite knowing that the given act does not have that feature. For example, suppose that Richard 
Nixon’s bugging the offices of his political opponents was morally wrong and that he knew this to be 
wrong. In that case he might still attempt to say why his acts were morally acceptable as part of an attempt 
to deceive the public. In doing so he would not be attempting to explain why his acts were morally 
acceptable, though he would of course be purporting to be engaging in such an attempt. 
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demystified – “Adolf Hitler became a bad man” – is not an object appropriate for ethical 
explanation. Such an object is non-ethical, for although it includes a normative 
component (“bad”), this object is incapable of playing a functional role in originating an 
agent’s motivation to act.10 It is important to recognize that ethical explanations (and not 
just the ethical explanatory sentences that are related to these explanations) are always 
non-causal explanations that have to do with why some object of ethical explanation 
obtains. This is why the first sort of question also fails to falsify my claim. Although the 
explanation given in response to this question would be an ethical explanation, such an 
explanation, once given, would answer an ethical “Why” question, namely “Why was 
Adolf Hitler a bad man?”11 Because ethical explanations always have to do with why 
some object of ethical explanation obtains, there will always be some corresponding 
“Why” question these explanations answer, even if we are able to phrase these inquiries 
in some way that does not make use of a “Why.” Since any instance of successful ethical 
explanation will at least answer one of these corresponding “Why” questions, my claim 
stands: Correctly answering a certain sort of “Why” question, a question about why some 
object of ethical explanation obtains, is required in order for ethical explanation to 
succeed.12 
Because ethical explanatory sentences answer these “Why” questions, we often 
make use of them when we engage in ethical explanation. But ethical explanation can be 
engaged in without making use of an ethical explanatory sentence, and the use of an 
ethical explanatory sentence does not always suffice to engage in ethical explanation. I 
can engage in ethical explanation without making use of an ethical explanatory sentence 
by, for instance, drawing a diagram or constructing a parable. And I can fail to engage in 
ethical explanation while making use of an ethical explanatory sentence by, for instance, 
                                                
10 Although “Adolf Hitler is a bad man,” “Adolf Hitler was a bad man,” or “Adolf Hitler will be a bad 
man,” each express objects capable of playing a functional role in originating an agent’s motivation to act, 
“Adolf Hitler became a bad man,” can only play a subsidiary or enabling role in motivating an agent to act. 
This is because this last expression does not properly ground any moral attitude in itself. Only the former 
expressions do. 
11 Note that, as phrased, this question could correspond to either question we’re discussing, “In virtue of 
what qualities was Adolf Hitler a bad man?” or “How did Adolf Hitler become a bad man?” It is only the 
answer to the “Why” question corresponding to the first question that is an ethical explanation. 
12 By “correctly answering” I simply mean providing the correct answer to. It is certainly possible to 
provide the answer to questions not made explicit. For example, on learning some new piece of 
information, people sometimes say, “That answers a lot of questions.” In these cases, none of the questions 
that have been answered by this new piece of information have been made explicit.  
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uttering an ethical explanatory sentence from a foreign language without understanding 
it’s meaning.13 It is clear that what is required to engage in ethical explanation is not the 
expression of an ethical explanatory sentence, but is instead an attempt on the part of the 
agent to provide an answer to an ethical “Why” question, a question about why some 
object of ethical explanation obtains.14 If correctly answering this sort of “Why” question 
is required in order for ethical explanation to succeed, attempting to provide a correct 
answer to this sort of “Why” question is required in order to engage in ethical explanation 
at all. Just as we cannot explain why a given act is wrong (for instance) without correctly 
answering the question of why that act is wrong, we cannot attempt to explain why an act 
is wrong without attempting to provide a correct answer to the question of why that act is 
wrong. All of this is important because it means that any account of ethical explanation, 
the process by which we attempt to explain ethical features, must include an account of 
what it is an agent does in attempting to provide a correct answer to an ethical “Why” 
question. Because attempting to provide a correct answer to an ethical “Why” question is 
(at least) part of what it is to engage in ethical explanation, any account of ethical 
explanation that cannot explain what an agent does in making such an attempt will be 
incomplete.15 It is beyond the scope of this paper to venture a full answer to the question 
of what it is to attempt to provide a correct answer to an ethical “Why” question (and to 
do so would embroil us in unnecessary controversy). Nevertheless, at least this much is 
certain: If attempting to provide a correct answer to an ethical “Why” question is required 
in order to engage in ethical explanation, attempting to provide an answer to an ethical 
“Why” question is required in order to engage in ethical explanation. Just as we cannot 
attempt to explain why a given act is wrong (for instance) without attempting to provide a 
                                                
13 For another example, see footnote 9. 
14 An agent may attempt to express an answer to a “Why” question without attempting to answer said 
“Why” question if the agent instead is attempting to answer a question correspondent to said “Why” 
question i.e. attempting to answer the question “In virtue of what qualities was Adolf Hitler a bad man” 
instead of the question “Why was Adolf Hitler a bad man?”   
15 What else might be required to engage in ethical explanation? The answer to this question will turn on 1) 
one’s views about what constitutes a correct answer to an ethical “Why” question, in particular whether 
there are good-making features of explanations that are not built into the notion of a correct answer to a 
“Why” question e.g. whether the absence of irrelevancies in an explanation is required for it to count as a 
correct answer and 2) Whether one thinks that pursuit of all or some these additional good-making features 
is required in order to engage in ethical explanation e.g. a prankster delivering a correct answer to an 
ethical “Why” question riddled with irrelevancies might be seeking to obscure an object of explanation 
rather than seeking to illuminate it. 
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correct answer to the question of why that act is wrong, so we cannot attempt to provide a 
correct answer to the question of why an act is wrong without attempting to provide an 
answer to the question of why that act is wrong. 
So, what is it that an agent does in attempting to provide an answer to an ethical 
“Why” question? A natural thing to say is that an agent attempts to answer an ethical 
“Why” question by attempting to express an ethical explanatory sentence. After all, 
ethical explanatory sentences do answer ethical “Why” questions. Nevertheless, this 
answer cannot be correct, for we have already seen that agents can attempt to answer 
these ethical “Why” questions without attempting to express ethical explanatory 
sentences, and that they can attempt to express ethical explanatory sentences without 
attempting to answer ethical “Why” questions.16 Still, something important can be 
gleaned from the fact that agents often attempt to express ethical explanatory sentences in 
their attempts to answer ethical “Why” questions. And that is that attempting to express 
an ethical explanatory sentence is often a way of doing something else, that itself 
constitutes an agent’s attempt to provide an answer to an ethical “Why” question. What is 
this something else? A couple of possibilities present themselves. First, we might think 
that an agent attempts to answer an ethical “Why” question by attempting to express a 
proposition of some sort. For example, perhaps agents attempt to answer ethical “Why” 
questions by attempting to express one of the propositions that ethical explanatory 
sentences ordinarily express (A proposition of the form “X because Y”). Another 
possibility is that agents attempt to answer an ethical “Why” question by attempting to 
express a thought of some sort. For example, perhaps agents attempt to answer ethical 
“Why” questions by attempting to express an ethical explanatory thought, the kind of 
thought that ethical explanatory sentences ordinarily express (A thought of the form “X 
because Y”). These two possibilities may not be the only ones, though they do seem to 
me to be the two most plausible candidates. Nevertheless, although there may be a variety 
of possible answers to the question “What is it that an agent does in attempting to provide 
an answer to an ethical ‘Why’ question?” the non-cognitivist can answer in only one way. 
The non-cognitivist must claim that an agent attempts to provide an answer to an ethical 
                                                
16 They can do the former by (for instance) constructing a parable or drawing a diagram, and the latter by 
(for instance) attempting to express an ethical explanatory sentence from a foreign language without 
understanding it’s meaning. 
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“Why” question by attempting to express an explanatory thought, the sort of thought that 
is ordinarily expressed by an ethical explanatory sentence. We can see this by focusing 
on the second thesis that the non-cognitivist accepts, that “all sentences (including ethical 
sentences) can be explained solely in terms of the thoughts those sentences express.” 
Because the non-cognitivist is committed to explaining ethical explanatory sentences 
solely in terms of the thoughts these sentences express, and these sentences answer 
ethical “Why” questions, the non-cognitivist must say that ethical explanatory sentences 
answer these ethical “Why” questions in virtue of the thoughts they express – explanatory 
thoughts. This means, crucially, that the non-cognitivist must claim that what it is for an 
agent to attempt to provide an answer to an ethical “Why” question (to engage in ethical 
explanation) is to attempt to express one of these explanatory thoughts. All of this is to 
say, that for the non-cognitivist, expressing explanatory thoughts is how one engages in 
ethical explanation. This means that an account of these thoughts is, as I stated earlier, 
required for a non-cognitivist account of ethical explanation. Since we can test whether 
the non-cognitivist can account for these thoughts by testing whether they can account for 
the meanings of ethical explanatory sentences, we can now clearly see that an appropriate 
way of testing whether non-cognitivism can account for ethical explanation is by testing 
whether non-cognitivism can account for the meanings of these sentences. 
If explanatory thoughts are so important for ethical explanation and ethical 
explanatory sentences comparably less so, one might wonder why I don’t propose to test 
whether the non-cognitivist can account for ethical explanation more directly, by 
focusing on the explanatory thoughts themselves. To be clear, my interest in ethical 
explanatory sentences is a product of my interest in the explanatory thoughts these 
sentences express. And much of what I have said and will say does focus directly on 
these explanatory thoughts. Nevertheless, I stand by my proposed test, for two reasons.  
Firstly, let me reiterate, because non-cognitivism explains sentence meaning in 
terms of the thoughts these sentences express, testing for whether non-cognitivism can 
account for the meanings of ethical explanatory sentences is sufficient for testing whether 
non-cognitivism can account for explanatory thoughts in ethics. Secondly, and most 
importantly, conceiving of our test as a test about the meanings of ethical explanatory 
sentences, allows us to locate the challenge for non-cognitivism, the challenge of giving 
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an account of ethical explanation, in a familiar place. We can see that the challenge non-
cognitivism faces in giving such an account is simply a particular instance of the 
challenge of answering the classic embedding problem; we can see it as the challenge 
non-cognitivism faces in accounting for the meanings of the complex ethical sentences 
that express the explanatory thoughts necessary for ethical explanation. Seeing the 
challenge in this light allows us to better understand some of the difficulties the non-
cognitivist faces in giving an account of ethical explanation. But even more importantly, 
seeing the challenge in this light will allow us to better understand how the non-
cognitivist must answer it. For these reasons, the test I’ve proposed is not just 
appropriate. It is also useful. For thinking of this test as embodying this particular 
challenge will serve to structure our attempt to answer this paper’s question, the question 






















Chapter 2 – Responding to the Embedding Problem 
 
2.1 The Embedding Problem 
I have argued that we can think of the challenge non-cognitivism faces with 
respect to giving an account of ethical explanation as the challenge non-cognitivism faces 
in accounting for the meanings ethical explanatory sentences. This is the challenge of 
accounting for meanings of the ethical sentences that express the explanatory thoughts 
necessary for ethical explanation, and it is a particular instance of the classic embedding 
problem. In this section, I describe that problem. This section mainly serves as 
background for Gibbard’s attempted solution to the problem, which I present in the 
following section. That attempted solution will itself allow us to see in more detail the 
resources the non-cognitivist has available to address the particular instance of the 
embedding problem we’re interested in. 
The embedding problem, also known as the Frege-Geach problem, is a classic 
problem non-cognitivism faces in accounting for the meanings of complex sentences that 
embed simple, predicative ethical sentences.17 The non-cognitivist faces a problem 
because simple ethical sentences are capable of embedding in all of the same contexts as 
simple non-ethical sentences and appear to function the same as non-ethical sentences 
once embedded. But according to the non-cognitivist, ethical sentences express thoughts 
that motivate while non-ethical sentences generally express thoughts that represent. So it 
is hard to see why these distinct types of sentences should function the same. 
Let me give a concrete example. Like the non-ethical sentence “Chairs support 
persons,” the ethical sentence “Lying is wrong,” is capable of being embedded in a 
premise of an argument, and of playing a role in that argument’s validity. Consider the 
following two arguments: 
 
 (1) Lying is wrong. 
 (2) If lying is wrong, it’s wrong to get your brother to lie. 
 So: (3) It’s wrong to get your brother to lie. 
 
                                                
17Some of the earliest discussion of this problem is in Geach (1965) and Searle (1962).  
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 (4) Chairs support persons. 
 (5) If chairs support persons, chairs support mice. 
 So: (6) Chairs support mice. 
 
One way of making sense of the second argument’s validity it by claiming that the phrase 
“Chairs support persons,” has the same meaning as it appears in (4) and in the antecedent 
of (5). This allows one to see this argument as an instance of modus ponens. But the non-
cognitivist cannot say this about the first argument. This is because (among other things) 
the non-cognitivist must explain the meaning of “Lying is wrong,” in (1) as expressing 
some thought that plays some functional role in originating and agent’s motivation to act 
(presumably not to lie). But the phrase “Lying is wrong” in (2) does not play this same 
role in motivating the agent to act since I can accept (2) without being motivated in the 
same way as (1). This means the meaning of the phrase “Lying is wrong,” must differ 
from (1) to (2). And since this is the case, the non-cognitivist cannot explain the validity 
of the first argument by seeing it as an instance of modus ponens (since the antecedent of 
the conditional claim in modus ponens must match the other premise). They must explain 
the appropriateness of the transition from (1) & (2) to (3) in some other way. And they 
must explain the meaning of (2) as expressing some thought or thoughts that does not 
include the ethical thought that (1) expresses.18 
 Although the non-cognitivist has trouble explaining the meanings of conditional 
claims that embed simple ethical sentences like (2), and of explaining how these 
sentences can play a role in making an argument valid, these are not the only sentences 
the non-cognitivist has difficulty explaining. In Being For, Mark Schroeder emphasizes 
the extent of the non-cognitivist’s problem nicely:19 
 
In fact, and this cannot be emphasized enough, every natural-language 
construction that admits of descriptive predicates admits of moral predicates, and 
seems to function in precisely the same way: tense; conditionals; every kind of 
modal–alethic, epistemic, or deontic; qualifiers like ‘yesterday’; generics and 
                                                
18 Indeed, (2) may not express an ethical thought at all. 
19 Schroeder (2008) p. 5 
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habituals; complement-taking verbs like ‘proved that’ and ‘wonders whether’; 
infinitive-taking verbs of every class, including ‘expects to’, ‘wants to’, and 
‘compels to’; binary quantifiers like ‘many’ and ‘most’; and more. It is crucially 
important to understand that the embedding problem for non-cognitivism is not 
simply a problem about the validity of modus ponens, or even simply about logic. 
Every construction in natural languages seems to work equally well no matter 
whether normative or descriptive language is involved, and to yield complex 
sentences with the same semantic properties. So any view on which moral 
language works in some way that is deeply different from descriptive language 
seems extraordinarily unlikely to be true–at least if it is a hypothesis about the 
language that we actually speak. 
 
We can see that the crux of the embedding problem is that the non-cognitivist claims that 
ethical sentences and non-ethical sentences are importantly different– one sort of 
sentence expresses thoughts that motivate, while the other sort of sentence expresses 
thoughts that (typically) represent. Yet the view yields no obvious story about why it is 
that simple ethical and non-ethical sentences should embed in all of the same contexts 
and function so similarly once embedded. Indeed, non-cognitivism yields no obvious 
story about the meanings of the complex sentences that embed simple ethical sentences at 
all! Because of this, the non-cognitivist faces the extraordinary challenge of making sense 
of the similar behavior of embedded ethical and non-ethical sentences in these contexts 
while simultaneously making sense of these sentences’ divergent meanings at these 
contexts. 
It is no exaggeration to say that the embedding problem has come to be seen as 
the greatest challenge for non-cognitivism generally. Nevertheless our focus in this paper 
is not on this general challenge, but rather on a specific instance of it: Can the non-
cognitivist account for the meanings of ethical explanatory sentences? Our focus on this 
specific instance of the challenge is, we’ve seen, a product of our interest in ethical 
explanation, and of our interest in answering a key question concerning ethical 
explanation, namely: Can non-cognitivism account for ethical explanation?  
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Clearly, although the answer to this question is interesting in its own right, an 
affirmative answer to this question would not give us grounds for claiming that the non-
cognitivist could solve the embedding problem generally. It would at most give us 
grounds for thinking that this particular instance of the embedding problem involving 
ethical explanatory sentences could be solved. Nevertheless, I think that whether or not 
the non-cognitivist can solve this particular instance of the embedding problem is not of 
trivial significance with regard to the general embedding problem; I think that focusing 
on this particular instance of the embedding problem is instructive with regard to the 
problem more generally. Part of my reason for thinking this is that considering how to 
answer particular instances of general problems is almost always instructive in clarifying 
the nature of the problem and of the prospects for a general solution. But another reason 
is that in this case I am aiming to show that this particular instance of the embedding 
problem cannot be solved. If this is correct, than this would answer the question of 
whether the non-cognitivist can solve the general embedding problem, and so focusing on 
the details of this particular instance of the embedding problem is relevant to the problem 
more generally. In any case, as we’ll see, this particular instance of the embedding 
problem admits of no obvious solution. For that reason alone, it is worthwhile for the 
non-cognitivist to investigate this particular instance of the embedding problem, to see if 
they can do any better than I can at solving it for them. If in the course of examining the 
difficulties of this particular case a solution is found, the non-cognitivist will be only that 
much closer to finding a solution more generally. 
 
2.2 Gibbard’s Solution to the Embedding Problem 
 There have been many attempted solutions to the embedding problem over the 
years, though Gibbard’s is certainly one of the best at clearly illustrating the general 
resources the non-cognitivist has available for solving this problem. Gibbard attempts to 
solve the embedding problem for non-cognitivism generally by developing what he calls 
a “device of automation” for answering questions about the meanings of complex ethical 
sentences. Since, as we’ve seen, the challenge for the non-cognitivist concerning the 
meanings of ethical explanatory sentences is just a particular instance of the embedding 
problem, Gibbard’s “device of automation” is all too relevant for our purposes. In this 
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section I detail Gibbard’s solution to the embedding problem with the hope of providing a 
clearer picture of how the non-cognitivist must go about solving it. 
Non-cognitivists will have solved the embedding problem when they have offered 
a principled way of accounting for the meanings of sentences that explains how ethical 
sentences and non-ethical sentences can function the same way in various contexts while 
expressing different sorts of thoughts. Gibbard’s solution involves the basic thought he 
takes ethical sentences to express – plans. Plans, as Gibbard conceives them, are 
decisions about what to do in particular scenarios, including counterfactual scenarios. An 
ethical sentence like “Murder is wrong,” Gibbard claims, expresses a plan not to murder, 
for any agent, in any possible situation, where this is an available action. So construed, 
my plans include decisions for myself, about what I will do in a given situation, but they 
also include plans for others, plans for what to do in another person’s shoes.20 These 
plans for what to do in a person’s shoes can be very general, applying to all possible 
agents in all possible situations – as the plan expressed by the sentence “Murder is 
wrong,” is – or they can be highly specific, applying to just a single agent in a single 
situation.21 
This characterization of my plans as plans for others as well as myself, Gibbard 
claims, enables him to explain how ethical sentences and non-ethical sentences could 
function the same despite the fact that the sort of thoughts expressed by each sort of 
sentence are very different. Both sorts of sentences function the same way in a variety of 
contexts, Gibbard claims, because of the possibility of disagreement with both sorts of 
sentences. “People can agree or disagree in belief,” Gibbard says, “and they can, in a 
sense, agree or disagree in plan.”22 It is this capacity for disagreement, the capacity for 
ethical disagreement as well as for factual disagreement, that allows both ethical and non-
ethical sentences to embed and function similarly in the same sorts of contexts. Gibbard 
illustrates how this is supposed to work generally, by illustrating how it works in the 
context of the following argument: 
 
                                                
20 Gibbard (2003) pp. 48-49 
21 Gibbard (2003) p. 54 claims I can plan for what to do in the case where I am Caesar at the Rubicon.  
22 Gibbard (2003) p. 48  
 
 18 
(1) Either packing is now the thing to do, or by now it’s too late to catch the train 
anyway. 
(2) It’s not even now too late to catch the train. 
(So) Packing is now the thing to do. 
 
This argument, Gibbard claims, results in an ethical conclusion, and includes a premise, 
(1), that connects a statement of plan “Packing is now the thing to do,” to a statement of 
fact “It’s too late to catch the train anyway,” via a disjunction. We can understand the 
meanings of each of these sentences, including the sentence that mixes a statement of fact 
and a statement of plan expressivistically, by characterizing the states of mind these 
sentences are used to express. The first premise expresses a state of mind that rules out 
both deciding (ethically) that it’s not the case that “Packing is now the thing to do”, and 
deciding (factually) that it’s not the case that “It’s not even now too late to catch the 
train.” The second premise rules out deciding (factually) that it’s not the case that “It’s 
not even now too late to catch the train.” The combined effect on the agent that accepts 
both (1) and (2) Gibbard claims, is that the agent is forced to rule out deciding (ethically) 
that it’s not the case that “Packing is now the thing do,” to conclude, in other words, that 
“Packing is now the thing to do.”  
This explanation of the “force,” so to speak, of the argument, as derived from the 
pressure to move from certain states of mind to other states of mind that follow from 
these initial states of mind, Gibbard applies to purely factual arguments as well. This 
pressure is the pressure to be consistent in one’s decisions about how things are as well as 
in decisions about what to do, the pressure to follow through on these decisions to their 
proper conclusions. We can understand these decisions, including decisions that mix fact 
with plan (as the decision that (1) does), by thinking of them in terms of the possible fact-
prac worlds, worlds whose content includes a statement of how things are as well as a 
statement of what to do, that are allowed or ruled out by these decisions.23 We have seen 
that a world is ruled out by a decision if that decision rejects that world as a statement of 
how things are or what to do. For example, the decided state of mind corresponding to 
premise (1) of the argument above, “Either packing is now the thing to do, or by now it’s 
                                                
23 Gibbard (2003) p. 47 
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too late to catch the train anyway,” rules out all worlds in which the thing to do is not to 
now pack and in which it is the case that it is not now too late to catch the train anyway. 
In contrast, a decision allows a world just in case it does not by itself reject that world. 
For example, premise (1) allows both worlds in which “Grass is green,” and worlds in 
which it’s not the case that “Grass is green,” because it does not itself rule out either of 
these sets of worlds. 
Fact-prac worlds form an important part of Gibbard’s attempt to offer a principled 
solution to the meanings of ethical sentences in the variety of contexts they appear. We 
can conceive of a maximal contingency plan, what Gibbard calls a hyperplan, a plan for 
every situation one might conceivably be in. These plans will be complete Gibbard 
claims, if for each situation and each alternative available in these situations the agent 
either rules out that alternative or rules out ruling out that alternative, which Gibbard says 
amounts to permitting that alternative. And we then we can think of an agent who accepts 
a hyperplan, an agent with cognitive (and non-cognitive) abilities far beyond ours, who is 
fully decided on all matters of what to do and how things are. This agent would be in a 
state of mind Gibbard calls a hyperstate. This apparatus of decided states, ascending from 
simple decisions of fact or plan like “Grass is green,” or “Murder is wrong,” all the way 
up to the complete decision of fact and plan that is the hyperstate form Gibbard’s “device 
of automation,” for answering the embedding problem, and for explaining the meanings 
of sentences.24 Gibbard explains:25 
 
We can represent the meaning of a claim by asking in which such hyperstates a 
person would agree with it and in which she would disagree. Hyperstates, then, 
make for a canonical way to tally agreement and disagreement in the realm of 
judgments that bear on what to do. 
 
Here’s how this process is supposed to work. We start with a sentence whose meaning we 
want to explain. We then consider which hyperstates – states that can themselves be 
thought of as expressions of particular fact-prac worlds – would agree or disagree with 
                                                
24 Gibbard (2003) p. 83  
25 Gibbard (2003) pp. 140-141 
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the sentence in question. And then we use this matrix of agreement and disagreement at 
hyperstates to characterize the meaning of the sentence we’re trying to understand. 
Suppose for example that we want to understand the meaning of the sentence “Grass is 
green.” We’ll start by tallying agreement and disagreement at hyperstates. The 
hyperstates that agree with this sentence will be all those that represent that grass is 
green, and the hyperstates that disagree with this sentence will be all those that represent 
that it’s not the case that grass is green. We can now use this matrix of agreement and 
disagreement to help us toward the following explanation: The sentence “Grass is green,” 
expresses the mental state that represents that grass is green. And using a similar process 
we can be led to the following explanation of the sentence “Murder is wrong”: The 
sentence “Murder is wrong,” expresses the mental state of planning not to murder for the 
case of being any possible agent in any possible situation. 
Gibbard’s attempted solution is particularly helpful for understanding the 
resources the non-cognitivist has for addressing the embedding problem. Because the 
non-cognitivist explains the meanings of sentences in terms of the thoughts they express, 
any solution to the embedding problem will require specifying the sort of thoughts 
expressed by each and every complex sentence that embeds a simple ethical sentence. 
Gibbard’s apparatus of decided states that themselves are explained with reference to the 
fact-prac worlds they allow, rule out, or permit, allows us to come close to modeling each 
and every distinct thought the non-cognitivist might appeal to in explaining the meanings 
of these sentences. And this fact allows us to come close to appreciating every distinct 
meaning that the non-cognitivist might offer for each of these sentences. This illustration 
of fact-prac worlds thus delivers to us a very rich starting point for conceiving of the 
different kinds of thoughts the non-cognitivist might appeal to in order to explain the 









Chapter 3 – Non-Cognitivism Cannot Account for Ethical Explanation 
 
3.1 Basic Problem Cases 
 Now that we have at least a basic understanding of how the non-cognitivist must 
respond to the embedding problem, and of the general resources available to them in 
presenting a solution to this problem, I want to move on to describing a set of basic 
problem cases that, if existing, would undermine such a solution. The force of these basic 
problem cases does not rest on any of the specific details of Gibbard’s solution to the 
problem, but rather rests on the limitations of non-cognitivist resources generally. 
Nevertheless, the specific details of Gibbard’s solution should help us in understanding 
how these cases are supposed to work. I will first describe these cases, before going on to 
argue for the conditional claim that if there exist basic problem cases, cases having the 
features I describe, the non-cognitivist cannot account for the meanings of ethical 
explanatory sentences.  
Basic problem cases, I claim, are cases on which no possible non-cognitivist 
account of the meanings of the ethical explanatory sentences that appear in these cases 
could be satisfactory. I am thinking of cases like the following: 
 
Socrates & Euthyphro – Socrates and Euthyphro are two distinct agents who find 
themselves in astonishing agreement. Happily, their thoughts about the natural 
world, and all their non-ethical thoughts for that matter, are in complete 
alignment. In addition, their non-explanatory ethical thoughts are exactly the 
same; most importantly, they both concur that “One ought always do what all the 
gods love,” and that “One ought always refrain from doing what all the gods 
hate.” Nevertheless, there is one thing they do disagree about. Euthyphro thinks 
that “One ought always do what the gods love because the gods love it,” while 
Socrates denies this. He’s not entirely sure what does make certain actions the 
ones one ought to do, but he’s definitely sure Euthyphro’s answer is off the mark.  
  
I claim this case has the following features: It consists of linguistically competent agents 
who agree about how things are non-ethically and on all ethical matters of what they 
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ought to do, yet disagree, ethically, about why they ought to do it. Importantly, I claim, 
the agents’ agreement in this case about how things are (or how things might be) and 
what they ought to do extends to all possible worlds. Cases that include these features are 
basic problem cases. Whether this particular case does include all of these features, or 
whether any case could, we will examine in more detail in the following section. What I 
aim to defend here is the conditional claim that, if there exist basic problem cases, cases 
that include the features just enumerated, non-cognitivism cannot offer a satisfactory 
account of the meanings of the ethical explanatory sentences that appear in these cases. 
What I aim to defend, in other words, is that basic problem cases really are a problem for 
a non-cognitivist account of ethical explanation. 
Assume that Socrates & Euthyphro is a basic problem case. If so, I claim, we can 
conclude the following: 
 
 (1) Socrates and Euthyphro do not disagree ethically. 
 (2) Socrates and Euthyphro do not disagree non-ethically. 
So: (3) Non-Cognitivism must explain Euthyphro’s ethical explanatory claim as 
consisting of thoughts Socrates agrees with. 
But: (4) Socrates disagrees with Euthyphro’s ethical explanatory claim while 
making no linguistic error. 
So: (5) Non-Cognitivism cannot explain Euthyphro’s ethical explanatory claim. 
So: (6) Non-Cognitivism cannot explain ethical explanatory sentences. 
 
Allow me to explain how each of these conclusions (and so the argument composed of 
these conclusions) follows from the assumption that Socrates & Euthyphro is a basic 
problem case.  First, recall that on non-cognitivism, 1) ethical thoughts can be explained 
solely on the basis of the functional role these thoughts play in motivating an agent to act, 
and 2) all sentences (including ethical sentences) can be explained solely in terms of the 
thoughts those sentences express. This means that… 
(1) Socrates and Euthyphro do not disagree ethically. Consider that Socrates and 
Euthyphro are fully agreed concerning what they ought to do, including what they ought 
to do in all possible worlds. And since non-cognitivism explains ethical thoughts, 
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including thoughts about what one ought to do, on the basis these thoughts play in 
motivating an agent to act, this agreement about what they ought to do suffices for 
agreement about what to do. Indeed, one of Gibbard’s most famous slogans is “Thinking 
what one ought to do is thinking what to do.” Socrates and Euthyphro have identical 
motivational profiles, since they agree about what to do in every possible case. But since 
they agree on what to do in every possible case, they do not disagree ethically. For if they 
had an ethical disagreement they would have a motivational disagreement. But they do 
not. Additionally… 
(2) Socrates and Euthyphro do not disagree non-ethically. For Socrates and 
Euthyphro’s only disagreement is an ethical explanatory disagreement. Socrates and 
Euthyphro agree about all non-ethical matters of fact. And as we’ve seen above, Socrates 
and Euthyphro have no ethical disagreements. This means they have no disagreements, 
and this means that… 
(3) Non-Cognitivism must explain Euthyphro’s ethical explanatory claim as 
consisting of thoughts Socrates agrees with. Whatever the meaning of Euthyphro’s 
explanatory claim, it cannot include any thoughts that Socrates disagrees with, because, 
as we’ve seen, Socrates and Euthyphro have no disagreements. Except that… 
(4) Socrates disagrees with Euthyphro’s ethical explanatory claim while making 
no linguistic error. Socrates does not misunderstand that Euthyphro’s explanatory claim 
merely consists of claims he already accepts. He understands that Euthyphro’s ethical 
explanatory claim says something different from and in addition to the ethical and non-
ethical claims he and Euthyphro already agree on. And he is correct in this understanding. 
And this means that… 
(5) Non-Cognitivism cannot explain Euthyphro’s ethical explanatory claim. For, 
as we’ve just seen, the only thoughts the non-cognitivist can appeal to in order to explain 
Euthyphro’s ethical explanatory claim are thoughts Socrates already agrees with. But no 
account in this vein can square with Socrates’ disagreement. And this means … 
(6) Non-Cognitivism cannot explain ethical explanatory sentences. For the non-
cognitivist is after a general account of the meanings of ethical explanatory sentences, 
and if they cannot account for the meaning of a given ethical explanatory claim and its 
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attendant sentence, then they cannot provide us with a general account of the meanings of 
ethical explanatory sentences. 
If this argument is correct, than if there exist basic problem cases, the non-
cognitivist cannot offer a satisfactory account of the meaning of ethical explanatory 
sentences. Since, as I demonstrated in section 1, a failure to account for the meanings of 
these sentences would result in a failure to account for ethical explanation, we can also 
say that if there exist basic problem cases, than non-cognitivism cannot account for 
ethical explanation.  
 
3.2 Gibbard’s Account of Ethical Explanatory Sentences  
In addition to offering a general solution to the embedding problem, Gibbard also 
offers a particular account of the meanings of ethical explanatory sentences. Because his 
particular account is instructive for demonstrating why all non-cognitivist accounts of the 
meanings of ethical explanatory sentences result in basic problem cases, in this section I 
take up his particular account. Ultimately I will use the details of his account to construct 
a new kind of basic problem case, before we move on to the final section of the paper to 
examine possible non-cognitivist responses to these cases. 
Gibbard claims that the thought expressed by an ethical explanatory sentence is a 
particular hyperplan, a plan for what to do in every possible scenario. He illustrates this 
by drawing a picture of a particular hyperdecided agent, Hedda, who, in addition to being 
fully decided about what to do, is also fully decided about how things are: 
 
“Hedda, our egoistic hedonist, thinks that, in any possible situation, all and only 
acts that maximize one’s hedonic prospects are okay to do. In this sense, she 
thinks that maximizing one’s hedonic prospects and being okay to do are 
coextensional. She also thinks that an act’s being okay to do depends, 
explanatorily, on its maximizing one’s hedonic prospects. (The explanations in 
this case are not purely causal explanations; they are explanations of why to do 
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things or not.) In her view, then, maximizing one’s hedonic prospects constitutes 
being okay to do in a way that roughly parallels the case of H2O and water.”26 
 
This passage is puzzling for two reasons. Firstly, Gibbard claims that Hedda “also” 
accepts an explanatory claim, which seems to imply that this claim is somehow different 
from and in addition to her hyperplan. Secondly, Gibbard’s claim about constitution in 
ethics paralleling constitution in science looks suspiciously like a factual claim. But, non-
cognitivism is supposed to be able to explain ethical thought without appeal to facts. 
Fortunately, Gibbard later clarifies both puzzles in a way that is consistent with his 
overall commitments. Accepting Hedda’s view that maximizing one’s hedonic prospects 
constitutes being okay to do, Gibbard claims, just amounts to thinking the following, 
which he identifies with the constitution claim – that there is a prosaically factual 
property, the property of being egohedonic, such that for any act open in any possible 
situation s, act a is okay to do in s, just in case a in s has the property of being 
egohedonic.27 And this claim is precisely a statement of Hedda’s hyperplan. Just so there 
is no doubt on this point, Gibbard later puts it in the following way: 
 
“If the property of being egohedonic realizes the concept of being okay, that is a 
matter of how to live. Accepting this claim consists in accepting the hedonistic 
egoist’s hyperplan.”28  
 
We can see that accepting an explanatory claim is not different from or in addition to 
accepting a hyperplan, and the parallel with constitution in science is indeed rough.  
Gibbard’s view that ethical explanatory sentences express hyperplans results in 
two very odd consequences. Firstly, Gibbard must deny that any ethical explanatory 
sentence that expresses a plan short of a hyperplan is genuinely explanatory. This means 
that a sentence like “Lying is wrong because lying is willful deception,” is not in fact 
explanatory, on Gibbard’s view. Secondly, this commits Gibbard to the claim that the 
                                                
26 Gibbard (2003) p. 95 Down the page Gibbard says, “I’ll focus on necessary coextensionality, and then 
just note informally that a kind of explanatory dependence seems to obtain.” 
27 Gibbard (2003) p. 96 
28 Gibbard (2003) p. 116 
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meaning of the sentence “Right acts are right because they maximize one’s hedonic 
prospects, is the same as the meaning of the sentence “Right acts are those that maximize 
one’s hedonic prospects.” In other words, Gibbard must claim that every explanatory 
sentence in ethics means the same thing as some other ordinary predicative ethical 
sentence. This alone is enough to falsify Gibbard’s account, but it is worth pointing out 
that his account also results in a particularly interesting basic problem case: 
 
Hyperdecider Disagreement: Hedda is hyperdecided. She has a view about how 
things are in terms of non-ethical matters of fact, and she has a view about what 
to do in response to these facts. She plans to always maximize one’s hedonic 
prospects. She also accepts an explanatory claim – “Right acts are right because 
they maximize one’s hedonic prospects.” Hyper is also hyperdecided and agrees 
with Hedda’s hyperplan, her plan for what to do in every possible situation. But 
he denies the explanatory claim she accepts, thinking “It is not the case that right 
acts are right because they maximize one’s hedonic prospects.” Instead he thinks 
that each explanation of an act’s being the thing to do is hyper-particular and 
requires mention of every non-ethical feature the act has. As it turns out, Hyper 
claims, Hedda’s hyperplan is correct. But her explanatory claim is not. Zeus too is 
hyperdecided, and agrees with Hedda’s hyperplan. But he disagrees with both 
Hyper’s and Hedda’s explanatory claims. In fact, he disagrees with all 
explanatory claims and is very puzzled by their purpose. He adopts a slogan about 
ethics: “Thinking what one ought to do is thinking what to do.” Once you’ve 
decided what to do, Zeus claims, there’s nothing more to decided ethically. This 
talk of explanation adds nothing. 
 
3.3 Demonstrating that Non-Cognitivism Results in Basic Problem Cases 
Non-Cognitivism, I have claimed, results in basic problem cases with respect to 
an account of ethical explanatory sentences. These cases feature linguistically competent 
agents who agree about how things are non-ethically and on all ethical matters of what 
they ought to do, yet disagree, ethically, about why they ought to do it. Furthermore, this 
agreement extends to all possible worlds. I have already argued that if there exist basic 
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problem cases non-cognitivism cannot account for ethical explanatory sentences. In this 
section I aim to demonstrate that Hyperdecider Disagreement is a basic problem case, 
though what I say should translate to Socrates & Euthyphro as well. I will proceed by 
defending each premise of the argument in 3.3 and considering whether the non-
cognitivist can deny this premise. Although I will stick to talking of an agent’s plans for 
reasons of simplicity, what I say should translate straightforwardly to any other kind of 
motivational thought the non-cognitivist might want to replace plans with. By the end of 
the argument, it should be clear that non-cognitivism cannot account for ethical 
explanatory sentences and so ethical explanation. 
 
(1) Hedda, Hyper, and Zeus do not disagree ethically.  
In order for the non-cognitivist to deny this premise, he will need to claim that 
Hedda, Hyper, and Zeus do not share all of the same plans. He will need to claim that 
Hedda and Hyper accept some plan over and above the plans of Zeus, and he will need to 
claim that Hedda and Hyper disagree with one another ethically with regard to the plan 
each of them accepts over and above the plans of Zeus. Now, it is clear that each of these 
agents plans to maximize one’s hedonic prospects in any possible situation. So what 
additional sort of plan might Hedda and Hyper accept? One attractive option, is that both 
Hedda and Hyper accept some sort of higher-order plan that Zeus does not, perhaps a 
plan to plan in a certain way, a plan to be guided by different sorts of features. It is the 
acceptance of this additional sort of plan, one might think, that constitutes the difference 
between Hedda and Hyper on the one hand, and Zeus on the other; it is the acceptance of 
this additional sort of plan that constitutes accepting a claim about why to do something 
on the one hand, rather than merely accepting claims about what to do on the other. 
Now, in order for this to be a plausible answer, Hedda, Hyper, and Zeus are going 
to have to each act differently from one another in at least some situations (or some 
possible situations). This is because, according to non-cognitivism, ethical thoughts are 
explained in terms of the functional role these thoughts play in motivating an agent to act. 
If these three agents do not act differently from one another in any cases, this must mean 
that their motivational profiles are the same. And if this is the case there will simply be 
no distinct ethical thoughts to appeal to in order to explain the content of the additional 
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higher-order plans that Hedda and Hyper are supposed to accept; there will simply be no 
distinct ethical thoughts to appeal to in order to explain the difference in plans between 
each agent. 
One sort of obvious difference between each agent is a difference about what each 
agent says in various cases. For instance, Zeus will not be inclined to say anything about 
why a particular act is the thing to do, while Hedda and Hyper will say different things 
concerning why a particular act is the thing to do. Nevertheless, it is crucial to recognize 
that this sort of difference, a mere difference about what to say in various cases, cannot 
itself be grounds for a difference in plan. For one thing, Gibbard himself is explicit about 
mere verbal disputes being the result of confusions rather than being true ethical 
disagreements. Speaking of two agents who agree about what to do in terms of lived 
practical conclusions, but appear to disagree about the rightness of what they do only in 
terms of what they say, Gibbard says this:29 
 
I myself think there’s not much difference between them: they agree remarkably 
in thinking their way to decisions, and disagree only on what to say about it and 
on the words with which to think about it. Their disagreement is verbal; they 
disagree on what words to mouth. They have no serious difference between them 
on what to do and why. 
 
The non-cognitivist cannot make mere verbal disputes into genuine ethical disagreements 
in these sorts of cases, because it is clear that when two agents disagree about an ethical 
explanatory claim, this disagreement is about something more than what words to use (at 
least from the perspectives of the agents). These are disagreements about why to do a 
certain thing. Because of this, in order to claim that ethical explanatory disagreement is 
legitimate ethical disagreement (and not mere verbal disagreement), the non-cognitivist 
must find something more for this dispute to be about than simply what to say. 
 One could be forgiven for thinking that the source of the difficulty here must be 
that up to this point the non-cognitivist has adopted too restricted an understanding of 
what distinguishes different plans that has rendered him unable to make the crucial 
                                                
29 Gibbard (2003) pp. 12-13 
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distinctions between plans he needs in order to explain the content of ethical explanatory 
claims. After all, Gibbard’s “device of automation” for accounting for sentence meaning 
– the apparatus of decided states understood by reference to ruled out fact-prac worlds – 
only distinguishes plans intensionally, by the extension of the properties these plans 
concern at possible worlds. As Gibbard says:30 
 
… a plan can distinguish between situations only in terms of the prosaically 
factual properties of those acts. If two acts in two possible situations differ in no 
prosaically factual way, a plan can’t distinguish them, permitting one and ruling 
out the other. 
 
This understanding of plans as being distinguished solely by the properties they concern 
does unnecessarily limit the content of plans. Plans are, after all, thoughts, and thoughts 
can be different even if these thoughts concern the same things (and thus have the same 
intension). For example, my thoughts “Water is H2O,” and “Water is water,” are 
different, even though the things these thoughts concern (water and H2O) are precisely 
the same. Similarly, my plan to drink H2O and my nephew’s plan to drink water are 
different plans even though the properties that these plans concern are necessarily the 
same. What is needed to account for the content of ethical explanatory plans, it might be 
thought, is to distinguish plans hyperintensionally, thereby allowing that necessarily 
cointensive plans may nevertheless be different. The thought that this is what is needed to 
solve the non-cognitivist’s problem of the content of ethical explanatory claims is 
especially appealing, because explanatory claims are known to be hyperintensional. For 
example, although the sentences “That snow is white is true because snow is white” and 
“Snow is white because snow is white” are co-intensive (they both have the same truth 
value in every possible world), these sentences do not mean the same thing, and only the 
first sentence is capable of being genuinely explanatory.31 
 Making these new distinctions does allow us to make some progress on behalf of 
the non-cognitivist. For instance, the non-cognitivist can now explain Hedda and Hyper’s 
                                                
30 Gibbard (2003) p. 92 
31 The second sentence is incapable of being genuinely explanatory (at the very least) because no object of 
explanation can be explained by itself.  
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disagreement: Hyper, despite appearances, actually denies Hedda’s plan to maximize 
one’s hedonic prospects. Although Hyper ends up maximizing his hedonic prospects as a 
result of carrying out his plans, his plans (being hyper-particular) are actually something 
like “Do a1 in circumstances x1, y1, z1…” and “Do a2 in circumstances x2, y2, z2 …” and so 
on. We can now see that Hedda and Hyper really are guided by different sorts of 
concepts. Our initial suggestion on behalf of the non-cognitivist – that Hedda and Hyper 
accepted different higher-order plans about what to be guided by – thus has the 
appearance of being vindicated. Unfortunately for the non-cognitivist, this is merely an 
appearance of vindication. For although these new distinctions have allowed us to 
distinguish Hedda’s and Hyper’s plans, we are still not in a position to distinguish Hedda 
and Zeus’s plans. Indeed, we can now see that the difference between Hedda and Hyper, 
far from being a difference of higher-order plan, is simply a difference of first-order plan. 
Hedda accepts the plan, “Maximize one’s hedonic prospects,” while Hyper accepts a set 
of plans far more particular. But neither of these plans is anything like the higher-order 
plan imagined, the kind of plan which would allow us to distinguish between Hedda and 
Zeus. 
 All of this brings us to the core of the problem for the non-cognitivist, at least as 
far as this premise is concerned. The non-cognitivist cannot distinguish between Hedda’s 
and Zeus’s plans because the non-cognitivist cannot distinguish between an agent’s plan 
to act in a certain way and the reason why an agent acts a certain way. The non-
cognitivist cannot distinguish between thinking that one ought to maximize one’s hedonic 
prospects, and thinking that those acts that one ought to do, one ought to do because they 
maximize one’s hedonic prospects. The non-cognitivist cannot make sense of an ethical 
why at all, and this is because the non-cognitivist must explain why an agent acts a certain 
way in terms of what an agent does in acting.32 Recall, once again, that the non-
                                                
32 Gibbard (2003) pp. 188-191 explains an agent’s acting for a reason in terms of what an agent does in 
acting: “What, then, is this purported state of mind, weighing factor R in favor of doing X? It is calculating 
what to do on a certain pattern, a pattern we could program a robot to mimic. Let the robot code aspects of 
its circumstances (factors), and code alternative movements that it is wired up to have emerge from its 
calculations (acts)…The robot, imagine, attaches number representations (call them ‘indices’), positive and 
negative, to factor-act pairs. It then totals up the indices for each act, and performs the act with the highest 
resulting sum. If the robot is set up in this way, then the index it attaches to factor-act pair R,X then 
constitutes the degree to which it weighs factor R toward doing X. We ourselves can settle what to do in a 
like way, not toting up numbers explicitly, but proceeding as if we did. When we do, say I, we are weighing 
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cognitivist explains ethical thoughts in terms of the role these thoughts play in motivating 
an agent to act. This means that ethical thoughts are both simultaneously the why of 
action and the what. Thoughts about what to do serve as the reason why an agent acted 
and they simultaneously determine what an agent is to do.  
 Consider an agent who decides not to lie. She may decide not to lie for a variety 
of reasons, but let us suppose she decides not to lie because lying is willful deception. 
How can the non-cognitivist understand this decision? Presumably, the non-cognitivist 
will say that she had a plan not to willfully deceive, she recognized that lying is willful 
deception, and that she therefore decided not to lie for the reason that lying is willful 
deception. But notice what is going on here: the because of the agent’s reason is 
understood as a plan to do something, a plan not to willfully deceive. The agent will say 
that her reason for not lying is the fact that lying is willful deception; this fact explains 
why the act is wrong. Her thoughts here are many. She may think “That act is a lie,” 
“Lying is willful deception,” “Willful deception is wrong,” and so “I won’t lie.” But what 
is the ethical content of all of these thoughts? Is it not exhausted by claims about what 
she will do, namely that she will not willfully deceive and that she will not lie? The 
ethical content is exhausted by these thoughts. Do, or do not. For the non-cognitivist 
there is no ethical why. Once Hedda and Zeus agree about what to do in all possible 
cases, there is simply nothing ethical for them to disagree about. Because of this, the non-
cognitivist cannot explain their disagreement in this case as one of ethical disagreement. 
Hedda and Zeus, on our amended first premise, do not disagree ethically. 
 
 (2) Hedda, Hyper, and Zeus do not disagree non-ethically. 
We have just established that Hedda and Zeus, at the very least, do not disagree 
ethically. But perhaps Hedda’s explanatory claim, in addition expressing an ethical 
thought Zeus agrees with, also expresses some non-ethical thought Zeus disagrees with 
and that Hyper might disagree with as well.33 In that case the non-cognitivist could 
                                                                                                                                            
considerations. Regarding features of our situation as reasons to do one act as opposed to another, my 
theory is, consists in such weighing.”  
33 It seems implausible to me to suggest that ethical explanatory claims do not express any ethical thoughts. 
After all, accepting one of these claims commits one to accepting the ethical claim embedded in the 
antecedent, and ethical explanatory claims do appear capable of playing a functional role in motivating the 
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account for the disagreement between them as a non-ethical disagreement, and could 
account for the meanings of ethical explanatory sentences by (in part) citing the non-
ethical thoughts these sentences express. The non-cognitivist can deny this second 
premise, in order words, by finding some non-ethical thought that ethical explanatory 
sentences might plausibly express. 
What sort of non-ethical thought might plausibly account for Hedda, Hyper, and 
Zeus’ disagreement? I confess that I am at a loss as to what sort of non-ethical thought 
the non-cognitivist might possibly appeal to explain this disagreement. Admittedly, this 
inability does not amount to an argument. But there are perhaps a few things I can say to 
motivate this premise. Firstly, in every other case where there is a disagreement that 
concerns a “Why” question, this disagreement is a disagreement that concerns the domain 
of the object of explanation this question seeks to demystify. For instance, disagreements 
about answers to “Why” questions where the object of explanation is scientific, are 
scientific disagreements. Disagreements about answers to “Why” questions where the 
object of explanation is historical, are historical disagreements. And so on. In the absence 
of some compelling reason for thinking that ethical “Why” questions behave differently, I 
think it is reasonable to assume that they behave the same.  
 Secondly, both Gibbard and Blackburn have historically treated disagreements 
about answers to ethical “Why” questions as ethical disagreements. We have already seen 
that Gibbard thinks that the disagreements in these cases are disagreements concerning 
maximally specific plans (or hyperstates). Here is Blackburn:34 
 
If you say, for instance, “If an act creates happiness then it is good,” I will 
understand you well enough: this is voicing a certain standard, and 
acknowledging that standard means being disposed to value things on the basis 
that they create happiness. And values we already have under control. 
 
We can see that this passage implicitly commits Blackburn to understanding 
disagreements about answers to ethical “Why” questions as ethical disagreements, since 
                                                                                                                                            
agent to act. Nevertheless, if one still has doubts what I say in this section should apply straightforwardly to 
the claim that ethical explanatory sentences express only non-ethical thoughts. 
34 Blackburn (1998) p. 67 
 
 33 
he understands answers to ethical “Why” questions as expressing ethical thoughts. Once 
again, this point is hardly conclusive, and I am certainly not proposing that we disallow 
philosophers from altering their positions when difficulties with their views emerge. 
Nevertheless, both of these points sustain the following thought – that understanding 
these disagreements as non-ethical disagreements is ad hoc, and therefore requires some 
justification. In the absence of such justification, we ought to accept this premise. If this 
is correct, this means that… 
(3) Non-Cognitivism must explain Hedda’s ethical explanatory claim as 
consisting of thoughts that, at the very least, Zeus agrees with.  
Unfortunately… 
(4) Hyper, Hedda, and Zeus disagree with one another while making no linguistic 
error.  
Each of these agents understands that ethical explanatory claims are something 
different from and in addition to the ethical and non-ethical claims that each of them 
already agree on. Because this is the last premise of the argument that the non-cognitivist 
can plausibly disagree with, the non-cognitivist must claim that at least one of these 
agents, makes some linguistic error. Since we have already seen that the non-cognitivist 
can make sense of the dispute between Hedda and Hyper, it is clear that he must claim 
that either Zeus or Hedda is the one who errs in this case. But the problem for the non-
cognitivist is that no such charge can be sustained, since such a charge must be 
accompanied by an explanation of exactly what error Zeus or Hedda is guilty of making. 
On the one hand, the non-cognitivist must claim that Zeus makes some error. This 
is because Zeus’ claim is that ethical explanatory sentences are meaningless, but we do in 
fact use such sentences in our actual language. Since non-cognitivism aims to account for 
the meanings of sentences in our actual language (rather than be an error theory on this 
language) the non-cognitivist must say that Zeus is the one who is confused here. This 
means that Zeus’ mistake must be that he is already committed to some explanatory 
claim, because that explanatory claim expresses thoughts that he already holds. But the 
non-cognitivist is not able to give a distinct account of these explanatory claims (as we’ve 
seen) because the non-cognitivist is unable to distinguish the ethical thought that 
something is wrong from the distinct ethical thought why something is wrong. This 
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supports Zeus’ claim that (on non-cognitivism) these ethical explanatory thoughts are 
meaningless because they appear to suggest a distinction between these different sorts of 
ethical thoughts when there in fact is none. And this means that no charge of error on 
Zeus’ part can be sustained. 
This means that… 
(5) Non-Cognitivism cannot explain Hedda’s or Hyper’s ethical explanatory 
claim. For, as we’ve just seen, the only thoughts the non-cognitivist can appeal to in order 
to explain Hedda and Hyper’s ethical explanatory disagreement are thoughts that an agent 
(like Zeus) might accept even in the absence of acceptance of any ethical explanatory 
claim. But no account in this vein can square with the group’s genuine ethical 
explanatory disagreement. And this means … 
(6) Non-Cognitivism cannot explain ethical explanatory sentences. For the non-
cognitivist is after a general account of the meanings of ethical explanatory sentences, 
and if they cannot account for the meaning of a given ethical explanatory claim and its 
attendant sentence, then they cannot provide us with a general account of the meanings of 
ethical explanatory sentences. 
Because the non-cognitivist cannot account for ethical explanatory sentences, we 
can also now say that they cannot account for the explanatory thoughts expressed by 
these sentences, since the non-cognitivist must account for the meanings of these 
sentences solely in terms of the thoughts these sentences express. And since, as we’ve 
seen in section 1.2, ethical explanation (the process by which we attempt to explain 
ethical features) requires these explanatory thoughts, we can see that the non-cognitivist 
cannot account for ethical explanation as well. We are finally in a position to answer the 
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